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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Russell Dale Hilterbran appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdicts finding him guilty of attempted strangulation and felony domestic 
violence.  On appeal, Hilterbran argues the trial court abused its discretion by 
admitting statements the victim made to a forensic nurse during the course of a 
medical examination. 
 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 On February 21, 2016, 51-year-old Hilterbran battered his 63-year-old 
wife,1 Cathy Scholtz, while she was laying in her bed.  (Tr., p.158, L.25 – p.165, 
L.20, p.179, L.11 – p.181, L.13.)  Hilterbran and Cathy had been arguing about 
the fact that Cathy’s daughter was living with them, and Hilterbran “wanted 
[Cathy’s daughter] gone.”  (Tr., p.158, L.25 – p.160, L.20, p.181, Ls.6-13.)  At 
some point during the argument, Hilterbran “jumped on top of” Cathy and 
grabbed her face with enough force to leave a bruise on her jawbone.  (Tr., 
p.160, L.21 – p.163, L.6, p.179, L.11 – p.180, L.2; State’s Exhibit 2.)  When 
Cathy told Hilterbran he was hurting her face, Hilterbran removed his hand from 
her “chin and face area” and “put it on [her] throat.”  (Tr., p.161, Ls.12-13, p.163, 
                                            
1 There was conflicting testimony at trial regarding whether Hilterbran and Cathy 
were actually married.  Cathy testified that she and Hilterbran had lived together 
for a total of five years and had been married since October 2015.  (Tr., p.154, 
L.18 – p.155, L.9.)  However, other witnesses, including Hilterbran, testified that 
Cathy and Hilterbran were not actually married, but that they lived together and 
held themselves out as husband and wife.  (Tr., p.184, L.19 – p.185, L.8, p.191, 




Ls.7-19, p.180, Ls.4-25.)  Hilterbran then “choked” Cathy until she lost 
consciousness.  (Tr., p.163, L.20 – p.164, L.21.)  When Cathy regained 
consciousness, Hilterbran “wasn’t mad anymore” and he “left [Cathy] alone.”  
(Tr., p.165, Ls.13-20.)  In the days following the attack, Cathy was very weak, her 
neck, throat and shoulders “hurt really bad,” and she had difficulty swallowing.  
(Tr., p.164, L.22 – p.165, L.8, p.187, Ls.1-14, p.188, Ls.1-18.) 
 Following an investigation that uncovered evidence of additional instances 
of abuse (see, e.g., PSI, pp.67-89), the state charged Hilterbran with felony 
domestic violence, two counts of attempted strangulation, two counts of 
aggravated assault, and several misdemeanors (R., pp.48-52).  Hilterbran pled 
not guilty and the case proceeded to trial on the felony domestic violence and 
attempted strangulation charges.2  (R., pp.57, 82-89, 171; Tr., p.1, Ls.17-23.)  At 
the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Hilterbran guilty of felony domestic 
violence and of one count of attempted strangulation (both related to the 
February 21, 2016 incident) but acquitted him on the second attempted 
strangulation charge (related to an incident that was alleged to have occurred 
earlier in February 2016).  (R., pp.116-18.)  The district court entered a judgment 
of conviction, from which Hilterbran timely appealed.  (R., pp.170-78, 190-94.) 
  
                                            
2 The state indicated before trial that it would “move to dismiss the balance of the 
charges in the Information” (Tr., p.1, Ls.17-23), and the trial court subsequently 





Hilterbran states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it admitted 
Ms. Scholtz’s statements made to the forensic nurse, Ms. Cook, 
under Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(4)? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p.9.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
Has Hilterbran failed to show the district court abused its discretion by admitting 






Hilterbran Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Allowing The Forensic Nurse To Testify Regarding Statements The Victim Made 
To Her During The Course Of A Medical Examination 
 
A. Introduction 
 Hilterbran argues the trial court abused its discretion by permitting a 
forensic nurse who examined Cathy at the FACES Family Justice Center on 
February 24, 2016, to testify regarding certain statements Cathy made to her 
during the examination.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.10-15.)  As he did below, 
Hilterbran contends the statements were inadmissible hearsay and should have 
been excluded.  (Id.)  Hilterbran’s argument fails.  A review of the record and of 
the applicable law supports the trial court’s determination that the challenged 
statements were made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment and 
were therefore excepted from the hearsay rule under I.R.E. 803(4).  In addition, 
correct application of the law to the record shows that some of the challenged 
statements were admissible on the alternative basis, advanced by the state 
below, that they were statements of Cathy’s then existing physical condition and 
were therefore excepted from the hearsay rule under I.R.E. 803(3).  Finally, even 
assuming the trial court abused its discretion in admitting some or all of the 
challenged statements, any such error was harmless and did not affect 
Hilterbran’s substantial rights. 
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
 A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion.  State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245 P.3d 961, 
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970 (2010); State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009).  In 
reviewing a discretionary decision, the appellate court “examine[s] whether: 
(1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) the trial court 
acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal 
standards: and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of 
reason.”  Id. (citations omitted); accord State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 
247 P.3d 582, 590 (2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 
C. Hilterbran Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Permitting The Forensic Nurse To Testify Regarding Statements Cathy 
Made To Her During A Medical Examination 
 
 1.  The Challenged Testimony And The District Court’s Ruling 
 Three days after Hilterbran battered and attempted to strangle her, Cathy 
went to the FACES Family Justice Center (hereinafter “FACES”) for a medical 
examination.  (Tr., p.172, L.16 – p.173, L.8, p.188, L.19 – p.189, L.2, p.273, L.21 
– p.274, L.23.)  At trial, the state sought to call Cynthia Cook, the forensic nurse 
who examined Cathy at FACES, to testify regarding the signs and symptoms of 
strangulation, generally, as well as Ms. Cook’s observations of the physical 
symptoms Cathy was exhibiting at the time of the examination.  (Tr., p.207, L.4 – 
p.208, L.6, p.208, L.24 – p.209, L.23.)  The state also sought to elicit through Ms. 
Cook’s testimony certain statements Cathy made to her during the examination.  
(Id.)  Hilterbran objected to Ms. Cook’s testimony, arguing, inter alia, that Cathy’s 
statements to Ms. Cook were inadmissible hearsay.  (Tr., p.204, L.10 – p.206, 
L.6, p.262, Ls.7-23.)  The district court ultimately overruled Hilterbran’s hearsay 
objection, finding after a foundational showing by the state that Cathy’s 
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statements to Ms. Cook were made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and 
treatment and were therefore admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 803(4).  (See Tr., 
p.217, L.23 – p.222, L.21 (court reserved ruling on admissibility subject to 
foundational showing by state that challenged statements fell within hearsay 
exception), p.232, L.10 – p.261, L.8 (state’s foundational showing and defense 
counsel’s voir dire in aid of objection), p.262, L.6 – p.265, L.17 (parties’ 
arguments and court’s ruling admitting statements over Hilterbran’s hearsay 
objection).)  Ms. Cook was then permitted to testify as to the substance of 
Cathy’s statements, as follows: 
     Q (By [Prosecutor])  And, ma’am, during the course of your 
examination of Ms. Scholtz, did you discuss with her an 
incident of strangulation that she said had occurred on or 
about the 21st of February, 2016? 
 
     A  Yes. 
 
     Q  And did she describe that occurring by an individual 
grabbing her by the throat and applying pressure? 
 
     A  Yes. 
 
     Q  And did she suggest that she lost consciousness as a 
result? 
 
     A  Yes. 
 
     Q  And during the course of your conversation with her, did 
you discuss some of the conditions or symptoms that she 
experienced during the course of that incident on the 21st? 
 
     A  Yes, I did. 
 
     Q  Did she indicate that she felt that she lost 
consciousness and felt some lightheadedness? 
 




     Q  Did she indicate that she experienced breathing 
difficulties? 
 
     A  Yes. 
 
     Q  Difficulty and pain with swallowing? 
 
     A  Yes. 
 
     Q  Loss of memory, loss of voice and throat pain? 
 
     A   Yes. 
 
     Q  And did you talk to her about how she was feeling 
physically at the time of your interview on the 24th? 
 
     A  Yes. 
 
     Q  And did she describe to you that that day on the 24th, 
three days after this incident, that she was having difficulty 
swallowing? 
 
     A  Yes. 
 
     Q  And that she was still experiencing some loss of voice or 
voice change? 
 
     A  Yes. 
 
(Tr., p.277, L.5 – p.278, L.17 (bolding in original).) 
 
 2.  Hilterbran Has Failed To Show Error In The Trial Court’s Determination 
      That The Challenged Statements Were Admissible Pursuant To I.R.E. 
      803(4) 
 
Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while 
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted.”  I.R.E. 801(c). Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible.  
I.R.E. 802.  However, I.R.E. 803(4) specifically excepts from the hearsay rule 
statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.  Specifically, 
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the rule provides that the following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, 
regardless of whether declarant is available as a witness: 
Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.  
Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment 
and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, 
or sensations, or the source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent 
to diagnosis or treatment. 
 
I.R.E. 803(4). 
 The rationale behind this firmly-rooted hearsay exception is that 
statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment are “generally 
trustworthy because the declarant is motivated by a desire to receive proper 
medical treatment and will therefore be truthful in giving pertinent information to 
the physician.”  State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho 210, 215, 953 P.2d 650, 655 
(Ct. App. 1998) (citing State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 507, 518, 927 P.2d 897, 908 
(Ct. App. 1996)).  This is especially true where, as here, the hearsay declarant is 
an adult.  In such cases, “the motive to speak the truth to a physician in order to 
advance a self-interest in obtaining proper medical care for the declarant or 
another is generally assumed.”  Kay, 129 Idaho at 518, 927 P.2d at 908. 
 In order to qualify as a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis 
or treatment, admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 803(4), the out-of-court statement(s) 
sought to be introduced must meet three foundational requirements:   
The proponent must show:  (1) that the statements were “made for 
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment”; (2) that the 
statements described “medical history, or past or present 
symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the source thereof’; and (3) that 





Kay, 129 Idaho at 518, 927 P.2d at 908.  See also Nelson, 131 Idaho at 216, 
953 P.2d at 656.  So long as there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that 
these foundational requisites have been satisfied, the trial court’s decision to 
admit a statement as one made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or 
treatment will not be disturbed on appeal.  Nelson, 131 Idaho at 215-16, 953 
P.2d at 655-66; Kay, 129 Idaho at 518-19, 927 P.2d at 908-09.  
 Applying these principles in this case, it is clear that the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in allowing Ms. Cook to testify as to certain statements 
Cathy made while Ms. Cook was examining her at FACES on February 24, 2016.  
The state established, through the testimony of Ms. Cook, that Ms. Cook is a 
registered nurse, employed by St. Alphonsus as “the coordinator for the forensic 
nurse examiner team.”  (Tr., p.232, L.12 – p.233, L.12.)  Although she works in 
the FACES building, Ms. Cook is actually “an extension of the [St. Alphonsus] 
emergency department,” and she is not an employee of FACES, the prosecutor’s 
office, or any other law enforcement agency.  (Tr., p.232, L.24 – p.233, L.12, 
p.258, L.14 – p.259, L.17, p.261, Ls.4-8.)   
 As a forensic nurse, Ms. Cook has specialized training in examining and 
treating victims of sexual assault and domestic violence.  (Tr., p.234, L.12 – 
p.235, L.14.)  When a sexual assault or domestic violence patient comes in to 
FACES, Ms. Cook’s duties are “twofold”:  (1) “to clear and triage … the medical 
needs of the patient and get them the referrals and resources they need”; and 
(2) to “collect evidence” and “photograph injuries and document them.”  (Tr., 
p.235, L.18 – p.236, L.4.)  While evidence collection may be a component of a 
 
 10 
forensic examination, Ms. Cook’s “primary purpose” in conducting such an 
examination is “medical in nature” – i.e., “to assess the victim[s] to find out if they 
need any medical attention, to refer them to appropriate wherever [sic] that 
medical attention may need to be to make sure that they’re physically okay.”  
(Tr., p.241, Ls.8-20.)  Likewise, Ms. Cook’s “primary purpose in gathering 
information” from the patients she examines is so that she can diagnose and 
treat them “medically.”  (Tr., p.241, Ls.9-25.)  Getting the patient’s account of 
“what happened,” including the “mechanism of injury,” is important from a 
medical standpoint because it guides Ms. Cook’s examination of the patient and 
helps her assess what kind of injury the patient has sustained.  (Tr., p.243, L.7 – 
p.244, L.18.)  The patient’s statements about the symptoms and pain he or she 
experienced, both at the time of the injury and while being examined, are also 
relevant to medical diagnosis and treatment as they help Ms. Cook assess the 
severity of the injury, whether the injury is getting better or getting worse, and 
where the patient is “in the spectrum of healing.”  (Tr., p.244, L.24 – p.247, L.7.) 
Finally, photographing injuries, while potentially beneficial in a prosecution, is 
also medically beneficial because “if, for instance, an injury is continuing to swell 
or the bruising extends, that’s important medically.”  (Tr., p.242, Ls.1-8.)  In short, 
“everything that [Ms. Cook] do[es] in [her] forensic exams [has] a medical 
component.”  (Tr., p.242, Ls.9-11.)   
 In addition to testifying about the purpose of forensic examinations, 
generally, Ms. Cook also testified about the circumstances of the examination 
she performed on Cathy Scholtz on February 24, 2016.  Ms. Cook testified that 
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Cathy was referred to FACES by a victim witness coordinator from the Boise 
Police Department.  (Tr., p.254, Ls.12-16.)  However, the law enforcement officer 
assigned to the case was not present during the examination (Tr., p.254, Ls.17-
20), and neither law enforcement nor the prosecutor’s office got to dictate what 
questions Ms. Cook asked (Tr., p.259, Ls.3-17).  After she examined Cathy, 
Ms. Cook referred her to a physician at FACES, and Cathy saw that physician 
the same day.  (Tr., p.255, L.15 – p.256, L.9.) 
 In deciding whether to admit the statements Cathy made to Ms. Cook 
during the forensic examination, the district court applied the correct legal 
standards, exercised reason and ultimately concluded Ms. Cook’s testimony was 
sufficient to establish the foundational requirements for the admission of Cathy’s 
statements as those made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment 
under I.R.E. 803(4).  (Tr., p.264, L.17 – p.265, L.17; see also Tr., p.217, L.23 – 
p.220, L.20.)  The district court was correct.  Ms. Cook’s testimony established 
that the primary purpose of the examination was medical in nature and that 
Cathy’s statements describing the fact that she was strangled, the manner in 
which her injuries occurred, and the symptoms and pain she experienced, both 
during the incident and at the time of the examination, were all “reasonably 
pertinent to [her] diagnosis and treatment.”  Kay, 129 Idaho at 518, 927 P.2d at 
908.  Because the challenged statements were made for the purposes of 
medical diagnosis and treatment, the district court properly admitted them 
pursuant to I.R.E. 803(4).  
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 On appeal, Hilterbran argues that the district court erred in allowing 
Ms. Cook to testify regarding the statements Cathy made to her during the 
forensic examination, asserting the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
statements shows “the statements were not made for purposes of medical 
diagnosis or treatment,” but were instead “made for purposes of collecting 
evidence for later criminal prosecution.”  (Appellant’s brief, p.13.)  In support of 
his argument, Hilterbran points to evidence that Cathy had already been to the 
emergency room before she was examined at FACES, that “FACES was 
partnered with law enforcement agencies and prosecutor’s offices,” that Cathy 
“was referred to FACES by a Boise Police Department victim witness 
coordinator,” that Cathy’s visit to FACES was “paid for through a Department of 
Justice grant,” that Ms. Cook was “trained to collect evidence and document 
injuries,” and that Ms. Cook referred Cathy to a “FACES physician” for further 
medical treatment.  (Appellant’s brief, pp.13-14 (record citations omitted).)  While 
some of this evidence supports the district court’s finding that, “Certainly there is 
a forensic aspect of this” (Tr., p.265, L.12), none of it negates the court’s ultimate 
conclusion, based on the entirety of Ms. Cook’s testimony, that the “primary 
purpose” of the examination was “for medical diagnosis or treatment” (Tr., p.264, 
L.12 – p.265, L.11).   
 As explained above, Ms. Cook specifically testified that, although she 
works at the FACES facility, she does not work for or take direction from any 
prosecutor’s office or law enforcement agency in performing her nursing duties.  
(Tr., p.232, L.19 – p.233, L.12, p.258, L.14 – p.259, L.17, p.261, Ls.4-8.)  
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Moreover, while Cathy was referred to FACES by a law enforcement agency and 
her visit was paid for by a Department of Justice grant, such did not transform 
Ms. Cook’s examination from one that was primarily medical in nature to one 
geared primarily toward evidence collection for a future prosecution.  Indeed, 
Ms. Cook testified that she never saw the law enforcement officer whose name 
appeared on the referral.  (Tr., p.254, Ls.12-20.)  Nor is there any evidence that 
Ms. Cook took Cathy’s statements and documented her injuries for the purpose 
of facilitating a prosecution, as opposed to meeting Cathy’s medical needs.  To 
the contrary, Ms. Cook testified that obtaining information from domestic violence 
victims about the circumstances and mechanisms of their injuries and about the 
severity of their symptoms is necessary for the accurate medical diagnoses and 
treatment of those injuries.  (Tr., p.241, L.13 – p.247, L.7.)  And, contrary to 
Hilterbran’s assertions, that Ms. Cook actually referred Cathy to a physician after 
examining her tends to support, not refute, the trial court’s finding that the 
statements Cathy made during that examination were relevant to her medical 
diagnosis and treatment. 
 There is no question that the purpose of a forensic examination “can be 
two-fold – medical treatment and forensic use.”  State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 
145, 176 P.3d 911, 917 (2007).  In this case, however, a review of the totality of 
the circumstances supports the district court’s finding that the primary purpose of 
the examination was for medical treatment.  Because the statements Cathy 
made to Ms. Cook during that examination fall squarely within the Rule 803(4) 
hearsay exception for statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or 
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treatment, Hilterbran has failed to show that the district court abused its 
discretion by allowing Ms. Cook to testify as to those statements. 
 
 3.  Some Of The Challenged Statements Were Also Admissible Pursuant 
      To I.R.E. 803(3) 
 
 While being examined by Ms. Cook on February 24, 2016, Cathy 
described her then existing physical symptoms, including “that she was having 
difficulty swallowing” and “that she was still experiencing some loss of voice or 
voice change.”  (Tr., p.278, Ls.7-17.)  For the reasons set forth in Section C.2., 
supra, these statements were made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and 
treatment and were therefore properly admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 803(4).  As 
argued by the state below, however, the statements were also admissible under 
I.R.E. 803(3), which excepts from the hearsay rule “[a] statement of the 
declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition 
such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental felling, pain, and bodily heath) ….”  
(See Tr., p.209, L.24 – p.210, L.4, p.228, L.25 – p.229, L.8 (prosecutor’s I.R.E. 
803(3) arguments for admissibility)).  Although the district court did not explicitly 
rule on the admissibility of these statements under I.R.E. 803(3), this Court can 
nevertheless affirm their admission on this alternative basis.  See Ridgley v. 
State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010) (where lower court reaches 
the correct result, albeit by reliance on an erroneous theory, appellate court will 




D. Even If The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Admitting The Challenged 
Statements, The Error Was Harmless 
 
 Even when the trial court has abused its discretion, such “abuse of 
discretion may be deemed harmless if a substantial right is not affected.  In the 
case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, this Court will grant relief on 
appeal only if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties.”  
Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d at 590 (citation omitted).  See also 
State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 420, 224 P.3d 485, 487 (2009) (“Unless an 
error affects a substantial right of a party, the error does not constitute grounds 
for reversal.” (Citation omitted)). 
Even if the district court abused its discretion in admitting the challenged 
statements, the error did not affect Hilterbran’s substantial rights.  Cathy testified 
at trial and described in detail both the abuse Hilterbran perpetrated on her on 
February 21, 2016, and the physical injuries and symptoms she sustained as a 
result.  (Tr., p.158, L.13 – p.165, L.20.)  Cathy’s daughter also testified regarding 
the extent of Cathy’s injuries and the physical pain of which Cathy complained 
and appeared to be exhibiting in the days following the attack.  (Tr., p.186, L.17 
– p.188, L.18.)  At worst, Ms. Cook’s testimony recounting the statements Cathy 
made to her while being examined on February 24, 2016, was merely cumulative 
of testimony the jury had already received.  Compare State v. Moses, 156 Idaho 
855, 867, 332 P.3d 767, 779 (2014) (concluding that even though the district 
court erred in excluding certain testimony, the error was harmless because the 
testimony was “merely cumulative”).  Moreover, considering the strength of the 
state’s evidence, which included photographs of the injuries Cathy sustained as 
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a result of having been grabbed and strangled by Hilterbran on February 21, 
2016 (see State’s Exhibits 2-11), there is no reasonable possibility that the 
challenged statements affected the outcome of the trial.  If there was error it was 
harmless.       
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment. 
 DATED this 31st day of May, 2017. 
 
 _/s/ Lori A. Fleming_______ 
      LORI A. FLEMING 
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